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WHEN IS AN AGENCY A COURT? A MODIFIED
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO STATE AGENCY REMOVAL
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1441
Nicholas Jackson
This Note argues that courts should interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which permits
removal from state court to federal court, to allow removal from state administra-
tive agencies when the agency performs “court-like functions.” Circuits that apply a
literal interpretation of the statute and forbid removal from state agencies should
adopt this “functional” approach. The functional approach, which this Note calls
the McCullion-Floeter test, should be modified to comport with legislative intent
and public policy considerations: first, state agency adjudications should not be
removable when the adjudication requires technical expertise, which federal courts
cannot obtain because they adjudicate cases in a variety of subject areas; second,
they should not be removable where an agency’s authorizing statute demonstrates a
clear legislative intent to prefer plaintiffs. Absent either  of these features, however,
court-like agency adjudications should be removable.
INTRODUCTION
State administrative agencies perform administrative adjudica-
tions in a large and increasing number of cases and across a
broadening range of parties.1 Often, state administrative tribunals
are indistinguishable from state courts because similar procedures
protect parties’ rights in both forums. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(2011), the federal removal statute, defendants may remove their
cases from state court to federal court when the federal court has
jurisdiction. In some circuits, parties in state administrative hear-
ings may remove their cases and in other circuits they may not.2
This Note argues that public policy concerns and the legislative
intent underlying the removal statute indicate that courts should
permit removal from agencies where agency tribunals function as
courts do. Yet, it also argues that general removal should be limited
where there is a clear legislative preference for plaintiffs and where
agencies have the necessary technical expertise.
1. See Revised Model State Admin. Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. 1–5 (2010) (citing the
growth of the state administrative state as justification for a uniform set of procedures).
2. See, e.g., Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus. ex rel. Richardson v. United States W.
Commc’ns, 288 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 2002) (forbidding removal from state agencies); Tool
& Die Makers Lodge v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep’t, 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (per-
mitting removal from state agencies).
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The disparate treatment of cases before agencies compared to
cases before courts causes real harm: courts treat defendants in
state administrative tribunals unfairly in jurisdictions where removal
is forbidden.3 Lengthy appeals processes burden these defendants
with significant costs and a scarce likelihood of success.4 Some cir-
cuits have remedied this problem by incorporating state agencies
into the removal process where it makes sense to do so.
Congress can best resolve this question. Congress should amend
the removal statute to include relevant state agency tribunals and
thereby adapt the statute to the growing administrative state. If
Congress does not thus amend the removal statute, courts should
nevertheless adopt the proposed approach to removal because it
conforms to the legislative intent underlying the statute.
This Note examines the legislative history and public policy con-
sequences of removal to demonstrate the rationales for adopting
the functional approach. Then, the Note proposes forbidding re-
moval in two narrow classes of tribunals because they do not
conform to these rationales. Part I of the Note discusses the func-
tions and history of the removal provisions of the Judiciary Act of
17895 and the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875.6 In this Part,
the Note discusses the Congressional intent that motivated the ex-
pansion of federal jurisdiction through removal.
Part II discusses the heightened need to consider state adminis-
trative adjudications as the role of administrative agencies
continues to increase. Next, it discusses the current circuit split con-
cerning the appropriate interpretation of the removal statute. This
part expounds the two approaches to the statute: the first adopts a
literal interpretation of removal by permitting removal of state
court cases, but not state agency adjudications, and the second
adopts a functional approach by allowing cases in court-like agency
adjudications to be removed.
Part III argues that a modified functional approach is preferable
for two reasons: first, it resolves a number of public policy problems
inherent in the literal approach. Second, it most accurately tracks
the legislative intent motivating the removal statute. The best solu-
tion to the problem would be a clarifying statute that applies the
appropriate reform. If that is not possible, then courts should nev-
ertheless apply the modified functional approach.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. See, e.g., Jessica J. Berch, The Costs of Litigation: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 39(A)(4), 83 TEMP. L. REV. 103 (2010) (discussing appellate costs in the
context of litigation for large defendants like Exxon Valdez).
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
6. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
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I. REMOVAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1441
This Part discusses removal and the legislative history and policy
rationales for the most salient aspects of its evolution. The history
of removal reveals an amalgamation of policy considerations and
historical flukes leading to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the current removal
statute. Before Congress passed the statute, the Constitution per-
mitted jurisdiction in federal courts over diversity and federal
question cases.7 The legislative history of present-day removal can
be understood best in the context of the first Judiciary Act of 1789,
which allowed removal for diversity between civil litigants,8 and the
Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 18759 (as well as some other closely
preceding statutes), 10 which first permitted general federal ques-
tion removal.11 The purposes for these statutes, as informed by
legislative history, included avoiding bias against civil defendants,
remedying unreliability in the state court system, and improving the
efficiency of federal tribunals.12
A. What is Removal?
Removal is a mechanism by which defendants in certain cases
originating in state courts may transfer their case to federal court.
This process is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2011). Under this stat-
ute, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be re-
moved by the defendant . . . to [a] district court of the United
States.”13 This process requires a defendant to file a notice of re-
moval in a federal district court.14 Notice of removal has an
automatic effect; once filed state courts may not take any further
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
8. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
9. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
10. See Separable Controversies Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866); Local Prejudice Act, 14
Stat. 558 (1867).
11. See generally, Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power,
1863–1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969).
12. See generally Wiecek, supra note 11. Congress had a number of other reasons for
permitting removal, including relying on the expertise of federal courts in applying federal
law and promoting uniformity of interpretation. See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a
Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95,
104–09 (2009).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2011).
14. Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant Lawsuits, 64 BAYLOR L.
REV. 50, 59 (2012).
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action unless the case is remanded to the state court.15 But, there
are some procedural limitations to this general right of removal.
For example, in diversity cases, all defendants that are joined on an
individual case are required to consent to the removal petition.16 In
addition, defendants have only thirty days from the date a case is
filed in state court to remove it to federal court.17
For many plaintiffs in the United States, the ability to select their
forum has a considerable effect on the outcome of their case. In
2013, defendants removed 32,041 cases from state courts, which
amounted to 11.2% of all civil cases heard in federal courts.18 In
addition, the differential rights of parties to forum selection are
considered significant and problematic in some areas of law.19 Win-
loss statistics suggest that outcomes are considerably more likely to
favor the plaintiff if she is permitted to remove her case to federal
court.20 Thus, the right to try a case in a federal forum may advan-
tage or disadvantage a significant number of parties.
B. History of Removal
The Constitution permits jurisdiction in federal courts over civil
cases between diverse litigants and over all federal questions.21 The
Framers of the Constitution provided for federal diversity jurisdic-
tion to avoid prejudice to defendants.22 James Madison supported
this provision because “a strong prejudice may arise, in some states,
15. Id.
16. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 11263,
§ 125 Stat. 758, 759–61 (2011); Lund, supra note 14, at 59–60.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see Lund, supra note 14, at 60.
18. See UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2013, CIVIL CASES FILED, BY
ORIGIN (Sept. 30, 2013), http://.uscourts.gov///-figures-2013.aspx.
19. See, e.g., Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 CONN. L. REV. 159,
162 (2013) (identifying the problem of differential right to forum selection in bankruptcy
law).
20. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Any-
thing About The Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581,
602–03 (1998).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority . . . to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens
of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
Foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” (emphasis added)).
22. See Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 614
(2004).
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against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them.”23
The Framers included federal question jurisdiction in order to ce-
ment the judicial branch’s role as the expositor of the law;24 to
ensure it is able to “say what the law is.”25 A final arbiter promotes
uniformity: “[t]o avoid the confusion which would unavoidably re-
sult from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent
judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one
court paramount to the rest . . . authorized to settle and declare in
the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.”26
Although the Constitution allowed for jurisdiction in federal
courts, it did not confer that jurisdiction because it did not create
lower federal courts on its own authority.27 The Constitution grants
the Supreme Court jurisdiction over “cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall
be party.”28 In order for original jurisdiction over other cases to in-
here in federal courts, Congress needed to establish federal courts
that had original jurisdiction over such cases.29
Under the authority of Article III, Congress passed the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which created a system of federal circuit and district
courts that had original jurisdiction over cases of federal law and
between diverse citizens.30 Among the provisions of the Act was the
right of defendants to remove a case in state court to a federal court
if that court had diversity jurisdiction.31 Absent from the Act, how-
ever, was any mention of removal for federal question purposes.32
23. Id. (citing 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVEN-
TION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1789 533 (2d ed. 1836)).
24. Lumen N. Mulligan, Jurisdiction by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1235
(2011) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
25. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
27. See Haiber, supra note 22, at 616.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29. See Haiber, supra note 22, at 616–17. Note that, of course, Congress may only grant
jurisdiction to lower federal courts over cases permitted by the U.S. Constitution in Article
III, Section 2.
30. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 § 1–4.
31. Id. at § 12 (“[I]f a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the
state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds
the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to
the satisfaction of the court; and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance
in such state court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit
court, to be held in the district where the suit is pending . . . it shall then be the duty of the state
court to accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause . . . in such court of the United States, the
cause shall there proceed in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process.” (em-
phasis added)).
32. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 § 12.
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In practice, this meant, in federal question cases, the original Judi-
ciary Act did not permit federal courts to review a state supreme
court’s final interpretation of a Constitutional or statutory
question.33
Federal question removal was born of emergency conditions dur-
ing the War of 1812. During the war, New England ship owners
harassed U.S. military and customs officers with frivolous state court
lawsuits.34 During periods of local unrest, Congress deemed state
courts unreliable in the protection of certain federal rights. Conse-
quently, it permitted removal of federal questions cases in certain
contexts.35 The Force Act36 further permitted federal officials to re-
move suits to federal courts because of local resistance to federal
claims.37 Under the Act, Congress permitted tax collectors to re-
move suits brought in state courts because South Carolina began
nullification proceedings38 and its courts no longer recognized the
federal government’s right to collect taxes.
Two statutes that preceded general federal question removal sim-
ilarly indicated doubt that state courts could competently apply
federal law: the Separable Controversies Act of 186639 and the Local
Prejudice Act of 1867.40 The Separable Controversies Act enabled
parties intending to remove state court disputes to federal court to
separate controversies that had diverse parties from those with non-
diverse parties.41 In other words, if twenty plaintiffs joined in a suit
against a defendant, and only ten were diverse litigants, the Act per-
mitted the defendant to remove those ten controversies. This Act
greatly increased the number of cases heard in federal court.42 The
Local Prejudice Act permitted a party in state court to remove to
federal court if he submitted an affidavit stating that he believed,
because of “prejudice or local influence, he [would] not be able to
obtain justice in such state court.”43 The original bill introduced as
the Local Prejudice Act applied only to states “lately in insurrec-
tion;” that is, former Confederate states.44
33. See Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress
and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 861–62
(2010).
34. See Wiecek, supra note 11, at 337.
35. Warren, supra note 11, at 91.
36. Force Act, ch. 3, 4 Stat. 632 (1833).
37. See id.
38. Warren, supra note 11, at 91.
39. Separable Controversies Act, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866).
40. Local Prejudice Act, 14 Stat. 558 (1867).
41. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 340.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id. (citing Local Prejudice Act, 14 Stat. 558 (1867)).
44. Id.
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Congress codified general federal question removal in the Judici-
ary Act of 1875,45 which coincided with a general broadening of
federal jurisdiction after the Civil War.46 This statute granted juris-
diction over federal questions to federal courts.  “[T]he circuit
courts of the United States shall have original cognizance . . . of all
suits of a civil nature . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States . . . .”47 It also permitted removal for such ques-
tions. “[E]ither party may remove said suit into the circuit court of
the United States for the proper district.”48
The latest major change to the relevant portions of the Judiciary
Act came from the Judiciary Act of 1887,49 which withdrew from the
broad expansion of federal power provided in the 1789 and 1875
Acts.50 The 1887 Judiciary Act increased the amount-in-controversy
requirement to $2,000, which prevented defendants in smaller
cases from reaching a federal tribunal.51 In addition, the 1887 Act
repealed the right of plaintiffs to remove cases from state courts.52
The House passed a bill that more significantly limited the right of
removal, and the Senate Judiciary Committee softened many of the
harshest provisions.53
C. Why Did Congress Change the Judiciary Acts of 1789 and 1875?
The history discussed in Part I.B can be understood as a general
trend toward permissive removal. During Reconstruction, Congress
distrusted state courts to follow federal laws, so it established gener-
ally applicable federal question removal.54 In fact, some have
argued that removal, generally, is an “implicit insult” to state
45. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
46. Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV.
717, 720–21 (1986).
47. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
48. Id. at 471.
49. Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (as corrected by Act of Aug. 13,
1888, 25 Stat. 433).
50. Haiber, supra note 22, at 623.
51. DANIEL S. HOLT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: A DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY, VOLUME II: 1875-1939 18, 28(2013), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/debates-federal-judiciary-vol-ii.pdf/$file/debates-federal-judiciary-vol-ii.pdf.
52. Id. at 28. This topic had been argued over in the passage of the Jurisdiction and
Removal Act of 1875. Ultimately, the Senate (and final) bill changed the House bill to permit
removal by both plaintiffs and defendants. See id. at 18, 28. The Senate was not successful at
including plaintiffs in the Judiciary Act of 1887. Id.
53. See Collins, supra note 46, at 741–42.
54. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 511 (1995);
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal
Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1826–27 (2008).
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courts.55 Because of this distrust, federal courts, through removal,
became instruments in enforcing federal policy.56 Removal was a
necessary tool for enforcing federal law when states refused to com-
ply.57 This became important when state governments refused to
acquiesce to the federal government’s authority to enforce the 14th
Amendment after the Civil War.58 Among the varied reasons for re-
moval, hostility of state courts thus holds special historical
importance.
Congress did not believe state courts would willingly apply fed-
eral law, so it permitted federal question removal via the Force Act
(discussed above), the Separable Controversies Act, and the Local
Prejudice Act.59 Concerning the Separable Controversies Act, Con-
gress mistrusted state courts’ ability to adequately apply the law to
diverse defendants.60 Thus, permitting the separation of cases oth-
erwise joined in a single controversy would result in such cases
being tried in federal courts.61 Similarly, Congress passed the Local
Prejudice Act in part because it doubted that local tribunals could
fairly adjudicate cases with diverse defendants because of local
prejudices.62
Congress passed the 1875 Act following a landslide 1874 election
that put Democrats in power.63 Given this background, and espe-
cially in the context of the Local Prejudice Act and the Separable
Controversies Act, some commentators have interpreted the expan-
sion of federal power as a way to ensure that hostile courts did not
adjudicate federal laws.64 Courts in southern states repeatedly
flouted Federal Reconstruction era laws, so the Act was a way to
ensure that federal courts safeguarded those laws, even in un-
friendly states.65
The policy of the Judiciary Act of 1875 clearly included an expan-
sion of federal jurisdiction, and there is little evidence in the
Congressional Record that members of the House of Representa-
tives were bothered by the Act’s broad expansion to include general
federal question removal.66 Instead, their discussion of the bill
55. Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 511, 512.
56. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 337.
57. See id. at 337–40.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 340.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 104 n.24.
64. Id. at 105.
65. See id. at 104–05.
66. See 2 CONG. REC. 4978–92.
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demonstrated a concern for the unfairness to defendants from be-
ing tried in a federal court outside their place of business.67
Notably, no Congressman discussed the expansion of federal ques-
tion removal that resulted from the Act.68
The final House bill ended up striking almost all of the removal
provisions intended to broaden federal power,69 but the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee largely rewrote these sections as provided in the
original bill.70 Given the importance of the national marketplace,
the Senate was unwilling to permit the prejudices of postwar state
judges and juries to impede interstate commerce.71 From the Con-
gressional Record, it appears that the Senate did not discuss the
Judiciary Act of 1875 on the Senate floor at all.72 Unsurprisingly,
this provision did not trouble legislators because previous legisla-
tion had already extended the right of removal to federal questions.
The House, in particular, was not concerned with the increased
number or variety of cases in federal court, but rather with fairness
in the application of the new grounds for removal.  House mem-
bers feared that defendants might be forced to litigate in a state far
removed from their residence or place of business.73
Finally, this Note must account for the departure in the Judiciary
Act of 1887 from Congress’s general distrust, expressed in earlier
versions of the statute. The two major provisions of the Judiciary
Act that limited the right of parties to remove (forbidding plaintiffs
to remove and increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement)
tend to conform to the trend of distrust of state courts. Although
there is a consensus that Congress’s intent was to limit removal,74
67. See id. at 4981–83.
68. See id. at  4978–86.
69. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 341. This appears to support the opposite argument of this
Note, but it should not be read as such. Rather, the House was concerned, not about the
broad expansion of federal power, but rather only with concern for defendants whom they
believed would be hauled into a distant court. See id. 4981–83.
70. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 341.
71. Id. at 342.
72. See 2 CONG. REC. xi-ccii (Index to the Congressional Record, 43d Congress); 3 CONG.
REC. xi-cc (Index to the Congressional Record, 43d Congress).
73. 2 CONG. REC. 4985. “But to select a tribunal where neither the plaintiff nor defen-
dant nor any party to the suit resides may work a great hardship and even injustice in many
cases, and I see no cause for the rule; but it seems to be both prudent and sensible that the
defendant or some party to the suit should be within the jurisdiction of the tribunal selected.
This will have a tendency to localize actions and to compel the trial where some of the parties
are within reach of their witnesses.” Id. Here, Congressman Hager makes clear that his con-
cern in the implementation of the Judiciary Act was that the geographically ideal venue
would be chosen, both from the perspective of efficiency (the location of witnesses) and
fairness.
74. Haiber, supra note 22, at 624. Notably, courts and commentators do not overstate
the limitation. While the 1887 version does eliminate some of the opportunities for removal
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some alternative justifications for these provisions support interpret-
ing the history of removal as reflecting a distrust of state courts.
First, because plaintiffs may choose the federal court in selecting
their forum, also permitting them to remove would create an unfair
advantage for civil plaintiffs.75 House reports indicate that the
House repealed plaintiff removal because it was “just and proper to
require the plaintiff to abide by his selection of forum.”76 This pro-
vision should not be understood as withdrawing from a
commitment to broad removal, but instead in the context of fair
treatment of both parties in a civil case. Second, regarding the
amount-in-controversy requirement, one may interpret raising the
requirement merely as a policy conforming to inflation.77 By 1887,
the $500 amount-in-controversy requirement would lead to far
more cases removed to federal court than originally envisioned.78
As evidence of this fact, the amount-in-controversy requirement has
increased a number of times since the first Judiciary Act in 1769.79
For these reasons, the 1887 Act should be read as part of a histori-
cally consistent Congressional broadening of federal jurisdiction
beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Congress’s general broadening of the removal right occurred
against the backdrop of state court adjudication of every case ex-
cept those few brought in federal court.80 Because of numerous
policy rationales, some of which are briefly described above, Con-
gress chose to shift cases from state to federal courts. The Congress
that enacted the original removal statutes did not likely consider
the possibility of adjudication in state agencies.81 For this reason,
available under the Judiciary Act of 1875, it does not (and cannot) eliminate a defendant’s
right to a federal forum. Id. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has held that the removal statute
(28 U.S.C. § 1441) should be strictly construed, but some commentators have argued that
this does not conform with the legislative history of removal. Compare id. at 630, with Collins,
supra note 46, at 718–19, with Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 100 (1941).
75. Collins, supra note 46, at 7433.
76. Id.
77. Michael W. Lewis, Comedy or Tragedy: The Tale of Diversity Jurisdiction Removal and the
One-Year Bar, 62 SMU L. REV. 201, 204 (2009).
78. See Claudia D. Goldin & Frank D. Lewis, The Economic Cost of the American Civil War:
Estimates and Implications, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 299, 309–13 (1975) (describing the drastic infla-
tion caused by the Civil War).
79. See Lewis, supra note 77, at 204.
80. See Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 102–04 (discussing the reasons why Congress “shifts”
some cases to federal courts and leaves others in state courts).
81. See Suzanne Antley, The “Appearance of Fairness” Versus “Actual Unfairness”: Which Stan-
dard Should the Arkansas Courts Apply to Administrative Agencies?, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
587, 587 n.4 (1994). The first federal administrative agency, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, was created in 1887, after Congress had already made all of its amendments to the
removal statute. See id. It was not until the 20th century that the administrative state became
significant enough for Congress to consider it relevant. Comm. on Commc’ns & Media Law,
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Congress changed the removal statute in the context of a binary
adjudicative system, where state courts or federal courts were the
only available forums.
II. REMOVAL FROM STATE AGENCIES: PROBLEMS
AND INCONSISTENCIES
This Part addresses removal as it applies to state administrative
agencies. First, it describes the increasing impact that state agen-
cies’ court-like institutions have on matters that courts might
otherwise handle. Second, it discusses the current circuit split re-
garding a defendant’s ability to remove her case from these quasi-
judicial state administrative proceedings. Third, it explains why the
inability to remove cases makes the circuit split especially harmful
to certain defendants. Fourth, it lays out two additional inconsisten-
cies that justify adopting the functional approach to removal over
the literal approach. A resolution to the problem must explain why
federal courts treat state court proceedings differently from agency
proceedings over similar subjects. It must also explain the illogical
timing of appeals.
A. The Increasing Breadth of State Administrative Agencies
Since the 1940s, state administrative agencies have proliferated,
and their mandate has broadened.82 The policy areas governed by
state agencies have steadily increased from about fifty-one in the
1950s to about 117 in the 1990s.83 During this period, the role of
agencies expanded from traditional state governmental roles
(safety, agriculture, corrections) to include environmental issues,
labor, civil rights, and, ever-increasingly, social welfare services.84
Additionally, quasi-judicial decisions, which are often indistin-
guishable from court proceedings,85 increasingly occupy a more
“If It Walks, Talks and Squawks . . . .” The First Amendment Right of Access to Administrative Adjudi-
cations: A Position Paper, 60 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 343, 347 n.8 (2005).
82. See Revised Model State Admin. Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. 1–5 prefatory note (2010)
(citing the growth of the state administrative state as justification for a uniform set of
procedures).
83. See Cynthia J. Bowling et al., Cracked Ceilings, Firmer Floors, and Weakening Walls: Trends
and Patterns in Gender Representation Among Executives Leading American State Agencies, 1970-
2000, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 823, 825–26 (2006).
84. Stephen S. Jenks & Deil S. Wright, An Agency-Level Approach to Change in the Adminis-
trative Functions of American State Governments, 25 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 78, 83 (1993).
85. See Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a Bridge Between Law and Cul-
ture, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 1, 18 (2003).
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significant segment of states’ administrative duties.86 The Honora-
ble Loren A. Smith, professor of law at George Mason University,
argues that this “judicialization of the administrative process” is the
result of a political avoidance maneuver on the part of administra-
tors.87 By leaving policy decisions over individual cases to
adjudication, an administrator can use procedural mechanisms to
avoid making a value decision, which some political actors might
oppose.88 Courts have fueled the trend toward judicialization by re-
quiring agencies to implement court-like procedures that
guarantee due process in decision-making.89 The judicialization ar-
gument contends that the increase in quasi-judicial administrative
proceedings also stems from a desire to curb majoritarian political
will; that is, to protect the rights of individual parties through pro-
cedural due process.90
Much of the existing case law on state agency removal has con-
sisted of state labor boards and commissions, particularly with
respect to collective bargaining agreements.91 The question of
whether to permit removal from state agencies would be significant
if the issue just applied to labor and collective bargaining cases.92
Given the trend toward the expansion of the administrative state,
and, especially, the judicialization of the administrative state, how-
ever, it is reasonable to expect the breadth of this issue to extend to
areas where administrative influence is growing.93
86. Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427,
429–30 (1985).
87. Id. at 429.
88. See id. at 429–30.
89. Id. For the particular procedures that agencies follow, see Part III.
90. Smith, supra note 86, at 437.
91. See, e.g., Tool & Die Makers Lodge v. Gen. Elec. Co. X-Ray Dep’t, 170 F. Supp. 945
(E.D. Wis. 1959); Volkswagen De Puerto Rico v. Labor Relations Bd., 331 F. Supp. 1043
(D.P.R. 1970); Smith v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
92. See Jihong Zhao & Nicholas Lovrich, Collective Bargaining and the Police: The Conse-
quences for Supplemental Compensation Policies in Large Agencies, 20 POLICING J. INT’L POLICE
STRAT. & MGMT. 508, 510 (1997) (describing the periods of expansion of collective bargain-
ing since the 1950s); see also Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of
Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 63, 78
(1988) (describing the expansion of public sector collective bargaining).
93. There are a large number of cases where both state and federal legislatures regulate
simultaneously. In such cases, either the state or federal administrative agency is empowered
to hear the case. Among these include water rights and employment discrimination. See Rob-
ert M. Mahoney, Note, Don’t Discriminate Against Distinct or Highly Personal Harms: An Analysis
of Section 717 of Title VII Pertaining to Preemption of Alternative Theories of Recovery by Federal Em-
ployees, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 310 (2014); John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western
Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 362
(2006). Given the trend toward concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, we can expect that the
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B. The Circuit Split
The two competing approaches in federal Circuit courts are the
functional approach, applied by the Seventh and First Circuits, and
the literal approach, applied by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The
literal approach permits only administrative tribunals designated as
courts by state statutes (or state Constitutions) to be eligible for re-
moval to federal court.94 The functional approach permits removal
to federal court from state agencies with “court-like functions.”95
1. The Functional Approach
Currently, the Seventh and First Circuits permit removal from
quasi-judicial state agencies based on a “functional” interpretation
of the provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 that limits removal to “civil ac-
tions brought in a State court.”96 The functional interpretation
treats agency tribunals as courts when they contain some traditional
court functions and powers: an adversarial system in which an op-
posing party has the right to file an answer, the power to issue
subpoenas compelling the attendance of a witness, the ability to
punish for contempt, and the maintenance of records, among
others.97
This interpretation was established by the seminal case, Tool &
Die Makers Lodge v. General Electric Co. X-Ray Dep’t, 170 F. Supp. 945,
950 (E.D. Wis. 1959). In that case, the Tool & Die Makers Lodge (a
labor organization) filed two complaints with the Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board detailing a breach of a collective
number of mutually regulated areas between the states and the federal government will con-
tinue to increase. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 151–52 (2001).
94. See, e.g., Porter Trust v. Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist. No. 1, 607 F.3d
1251, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 2010); Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus. ex rel. Richardson v.
United States W. Commc’ns, 288 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 2002); Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170
F. Supp. at 950. Some federal circuits adopt these approaches in varying degrees of permis-
siveness and some have not yet decided on an interpretation.
95. Richardson, 288 F.3d at 416; see Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170 F. Supp. at 950 (“[T]he
question of whether a proceeding may be regarded as an action in a State court within the
meaning of the statute is determined by reference to the procedures and functions of the
State tribunal rather than the name by which the tribunal is designated.”).
96. Darren W. Ford, Note, Getting Past Function and Focusing on Results: When Should a
Proceeding Before a State Administrative Agency be Removable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(A)?, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 321, 331 (2009).
97. See Tool & Die Makers Lodge, 170 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
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bargaining agreement between the parties.98 The Board filed peti-
tions for removal of the complaint to federal district court.99 The
court held that the Supreme Court’s dicta in Upshur County v. Rich,
135 U.S. 467 (1890),100 permitted removal in cases where adjudica-
tive bodies function as state courts. The court stated that, by
definition, “courts” are bodies that serve judicial functions, regard-
less of what they are called, so the plain meaning of the statute
incorporates certain agency tribunals.101 This case’s exposition of
the functional approach became the consensus opinion until
1972.102
Eleven years later, in Volkswagen de Puerto Rico v. Labor Relations
Board, 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972), the First Circuit vindicated that
approach. There, the First Circuit held that the defendant, Volk-
swagen de Puerto Rico, could not remove its case to federal district
court from the Labor Relations Board of Puerto Rico. The court
interpreted the removal statute to require a functional approach
because Congressional history demonstrated no intent to have
courts narrowly construe the statute to apply only to state courts.
The Volkswagen court also emphasized three relevant (though non-
exhaustive) factors for determining whether a state agency acts as a
state court: “the Board’s procedures and enforcement powers, the
locus of traditional jurisdiction over breaches of contract, and the
respective state and federal interests in the subject matter and in
the provision of a forum.”103
The Seventh Circuit similarly applies a version of the functional
approach. In Floeter v. C.W. Transport, Inc.,104 the court held that the
functional approach was appropriate in a case where an employer
violated a collective bargaining agreement.105 In its exposition of
the rule, the court specified that the procedures governing the case
are determinative of the conclusion as to removal.106 A defendant
may not remove from any tribunal, but only those whose proce-
dures “are substantially similar to those traditionally associated with
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 135 U.S. 467 (1890). In this case, the Supreme Court ultimately held that an admin-
istrative action by an executive officer may not be reasonably treated as a court proceeding.
Id. at 477. The relevant question for the Supreme Court was whether the action was “judicial
in the ordinary sense of that term.” Id. at 471. Presumably, the Tool & Die Makers court under-
stood that this interpretation left open administrative activity that is reasonably “court”
activity.
101. See Upshur Cty. v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 477 (1890).
102. See Ford, supra note 96, at 330 n.63.
103. Volkswagen de Puerto Rico v. Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972).
104. 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 1101–02.
106. Id. at 1102.
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the judicial process . . . .”107 This slightly more tempered approach
(only permitting removal in tribunals “substantially similar” to
courts) is the approach most commonly followed by courts applying
the functional approach.108
2. The Literal Approach
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits and the Eastern District of Michi-
gan have adopted a literal approach to the removal statute.109 In
these courts, regardless of an agency’s resemblance to a state court,
removal is not permitted unless the institution’s authorizing statute
defines it as a court. In Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries ex rel.
Richardson v. United States West Communications,110 the Ninth Circuit
declined to adopt the functional approach because it conflicted
with the plain language of the statute.111 The court held that when
the language of the statute is “clear and consistent with the statu-
tory scheme, the plain language is conclusive.”112 According to the
Ninth Circuit, the functional approach treats the removal statute as
if it were applied to “any tribunal that acts as a court,” when the
statute does not contemplate such broad application.113
The Tenth Circuit also adopted the literal approach. In Porter
Trust v. Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist. No. 1, Logan
County, Oklahoma (“Logan 1”), 114 the court held that Logan 1 could
not remove its case from the Logan County Board of County Com-
missioners to federal court.115 The court concluded that the plain
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits only state court proceedings,
and not proceedings in administrative agencies, to be subject to re-
moval.116 Also, the court noted a recent trend favoring the literal
107. Id.
108. See Ford, supra note 96, at 332.
109. Erica B. Haggard, Removal to Federal Courts from State Administrative Agencies: Reevaluat-
ing the Functional Test, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1831, 1856 (2009); see, e.g., Wirtz Corp. v.
United Distillers & Vintners N. Am., Inc., 224 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Detroit
Entm’t, LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Darling’s v. Chrysler Group, LLC, No.
1:14-cv-00208-NT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154917 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2014); Lou Bachrodt Chev-
rolet Co. v. GM LLC, No. 12 C 7998, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98870 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2013).
110. 288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002).
111. See id. at 417.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 419.
114. 607 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2010).
115. Id. at 1255.
116. Id. at 1254.
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approach, even among jurisdictions that previously employed the
functional approach.117
In 2013, a district court in Michigan held that the literal ap-
proach is more appropriate, creating a split within district courts in
the Sixth Circuit.118 In Smith v. Detroit Entertainment, the court held
that a defendant could not remove a case regarding unpaid wages
in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.119 The court
stated that Congress could have included administrative agencies in
its removal statute but opted not to.120
Because of the circuit split, the question of removal from state
administrative agencies to federal courts remains open and contin-
ues to create inconsistencies in the treatment of parties in state
administrative proceedings.121 In addition, some circuit courts have
not yet considered whether to apply the functional or literal ap-
proach to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.122 This circuit split poses significant
problems for defendants in jurisdictions that use the literal ap-
proach. In those cases, defendants who want to change forums have
no recourse, even though Congress intended for the cases to be
removable.
C. Why Not Agencies? Problems Resulting from the Circuit Split
The differences in treatment across circuits have real conse-
quences for parties in administrative hearings: forbidding removal
tends to disadvantage defendants, and appeal of agency decisions is
especially difficult and costly.123 There is evidence that the state
agency forum advantages plaintiffs because plaintiffs are exclusively
117. Id. at 1254–55.
118. See Smith v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 919 F. Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Mich. 2013); see also Ford
Motor Co. v. McCullion, No. C2-88-142, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19116 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14,
1989) (adopting the functional approach).
119. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 884.
120. See id. at 888.
121. It might be argued that courts are approaching a consensus on the literal approach.
See Porter Trust v. Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist. No. 1, 607 F.3d 1251,
1251–52 (10th Cir. 2010). However, the Sixth Circuit has not yet dealt with the question and
district courts within the circuit have rendered conflicting interpretations. Wren M. Williams,
Removal Jurisdiction – Removable or Not? The Indecisive Sixth Circuit Creates its Own Split Within the
Circuit Court Split Regarding Removal of Actions from Administrative Agencies to Federal Courts –
Smith v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, No. 12-12967, 2013 WL 119673 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 2013), 37 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247, 247 (2013). Thus, an inference of consensus is unwarranted.
122. A Lexis search of circuit court cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits produced no relevant results.
123. See, e.g., Berch, supra note 4 (discussing appellate costs in the context of litigation for
large defendants, like Exxon Valdez).
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empowered to choose their forum.124 This advantage is problematic
because defendants in agency proceedings are arbitrarily subject to
greater harm depending on the jurisdiction where their case is
heard.125 In addition, an inconsistency among circuits must be recti-
fied, regardless of whether removal should be permitted from
agencies.126 If the purpose of the removal statute is to permit re-
moval over the cases state courts adjudicated when the statute was
passed, then removal should extend to proceedings before adminis-
trative agencies. On the other hand removal may undercut the
value of agency expertise and efficiency in certain cases. In such
cases, the agency is not like a court, and there are legitimate policy
reasons to treat it differently.127
First, agencies handle many of the same cases that would have
been handled in a state court when the removal statute was first
enacted. Because administrative agencies adjudicate these cases to-
day, it would frustrate Congress’s intent to treat them differently.128
In addition, defendants in circuits that prohibit removal face signifi-
cant disadvantages compared to their counterparts in circuits that
permit removal.129 Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that
defendants who successfully remove their cases to federal court win
more often than those whose cases originate in federal court.130
Analysis of win-loss rates in federal court demonstrates that removal
of civil cases to federal courts decreases the plaintiffs’ win rate.
Plaintiffs in federal question cases, excluding prisoner litigation,
win fifty-two percent of the time when the cases originate in federal
court and only twenty-five percent of the time when they are re-
moved from state courts.131 In diversity cases, plaintiffs win about
sixty-nine percent of the time when cases originate in federal court
and 27.6% of the time when they are removed from state courts.
These disparities are concerning because general win rates in fed-
eral and state courts are similar. Thus, when the plaintiff chooses
the forum, she wins more often than when the defendant chooses
124. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 602–03.
125. The circuit split itself treats defendants differently depending on the jurisdiction
they are in, and to the serious detriment of some defendants.
126. A lack of uniformity is undesirable because it is “antithetical to the doctrinal consis-
tency that is required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved.” Ford, supra
note 96, at 323 n.16 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983)).
127. For example, institutions with expertise in an area are likely more efficient and more
accurate in the adjudication of individual cases.
128. See supra Part I.C (describing the historical trend to broadening the removal right
for cases brought before the only state adjudicative bodies at the time, state courts).
129. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 602–03.
130. See generally id.
131. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 594–95.
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the forum. The benefits of forum shopping are also well-docu-
mented elsewhere.132 It is a reasonable inference that the same
benefit accrues to defendants removing from state agencies.
Second, there may be biases that influence administrative agen-
cies and that defendants are best suited to identify.133 There is some
evidence, for example, that administrative agencies, including state
agencies, have the incentive to self-aggrandize, which can skew their
adjudicative decisions.134 Individual actors and the heads of agen-
cies have incentives to perpetuate their agency’s influence and
extend its jurisdiction.135 There is also evidence that plaintiffs who
are more certain of a trial’s outcome are more likely to sue and
carry it to trial.136 Thus, agencies may entice litigants by offering
favorable outcomes to plaintiffs, thereby increasing their own influ-
ence. State agencies are not necessarily immune from the same
local prejudices feared by the framers of the removal statute.
Of course, the same suggested biases might also influence federal
or state judges who handle similar matters but the effects of those
biases may be less substantial. First, the judicial branch has a set of
neutralizing features that are absent in administrative bodies. For
example, judges are democratically accountable in ways that admin-
istrative agents are not.137 In addition, the procedural rules of
courts are more complex and more strictly enforced than those of
132. See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 200 (2000);
Robert A. Zink & Walter E. Zink II, Eliminating a Most Convenient Forum: The Case for Restricting
the Extraterritorial Operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 48–115(2)(b), 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 3
(2004) (discussing forum shopping in Nebraska).
133. They are best suited to know of the biases they face because they appear frequently
before administrative adjudicators. Because they are most knowledgeable, they should be
empowered to remove the case if they fear a particular bias.
134. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Govern-
ment Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 568 (2002) (“The agency head can mobilize
subordinate staff in efforts to expand the agency’s budget or jurisdiction or both, thus con-
solidating both the costs and benefits of such an effort into one institutional structure.
Subordinate staff will engage in these efforts . . . . They also have an individual interest in
augmenting the authority and importance of the agency.”); see also Timothy K. Armstrong,
Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 209– 12 (2004)
(stating that courts are willing to grant less deference to agencies when the legal question
tends to aggrandize an agency’s influence); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory De-
fault Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2127–29 (2002).
135. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 134, at 568.
136. See Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories
of Litigation, 41 J. LAW & ECON. 451, 458–61 (1998) (noting that trial rates are affected by the
plaintiff’s knowledge of her likelihood to win and by her win rate).
137. Federal judges are accountable because they are appointed by the President, while
agency adjudicators are not hired by politically accountable actors. Also, federal judges are
constrained by procedural mechanisms that limit their discretion. Finally, even though fed-
eral judges do possess a degree of independence in decision-making, they tend not to
exercise that independence. See Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare,
112 MICH. L. REV. 575, 583–84 (2014) (“[T]he law makes [judges] publicly accountable. A
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administrative agencies.138 Finally, because judges handle cases in a
variety of different areas of law, it is considerably harder for them to
apply a consistent policy preference to the cases before them.139
The foregoing harms are especially unfair because the appellate
process is arduous and costly. Also, is it highly unlikely that a party
will eventually obtain judicial review in a federal court. First, all
state court systems have a mechanism for judicial review of agency
actions.140 Many states follow the Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which outlines suggested procedures for state agencies
and the deference afforded to them in state courts.141 Thus, the
typical path for a dispute originating in a state court is an appeal of
the agency’s decision to either a state trial or appellate court for
review.142 Then, once the state appeals process has been exhausted,
remaining federal or constitutional questions may be appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court.143 Even if the defendant does successfully
navigate the difficult appeals process, the cost of appeals will cer-
tainly deter defendants whose transaction costs exceed the cost of
the judgment.144
Regardless of its normative implications, differences among juris-
dictions as to defendants’ right to remove must be rectified. The
plaintiff’s right to forum selection permits her to choose the adjudi-
cative body in which she is most likely to win. At present,
defendants may remove cases originating in state agencies in some
circuits and not others.145 This leads to a disparity in the win rates of
variety of institutions could facilitate that public accountability: executive or legislative ap-
pointments, popular elections, the threat of recall, and so forth . . . .”); see also David
Pimental, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of
Judges’ Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009) (asserting that independence
need not, in fact, result in misconduct under certain circumstances). But see Layne S. Keele,
Why the Judicial Elections Debate Matters Less Than You Think: Retention as the Cornerstone of Inde-
pendence and Accountability, 47 AKRON L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2014) (framing the long-term
retention of judges as leading to the lack of accountability in many cases).
138. Nancy D. Freudenthal & Roger C. Fransen, Rulemaking and Contested Case Practice in
Wyoming, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 685, 686 (1996) (describing the perception of some
agency procedures as “second-class” as compared to “complicated” court-like procedures).
139. See, e.g., Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. REV.
1951, 1956–57 (2013) (discussing a variety of procedural safeguards intended to protect
against judicial biases, including recusal mechanisms).
140. See William R. Anderson, Judicial Review of State Administrative Action – Designing the
Statutory Framework, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 523, 527 (1992).
141. See generally Revised Model State Admin. Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. 1 (2010).
142. Anderson, supra note 140, at 526–28.
143. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-
Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 80–84 (2002).
144. See, e.g., Berch, supra note 4, at 104–06 (discussing appellate costs in the context of
litigation for large defendants, like Exxon Valdez).
145. See supra, Section II.B.
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plaintiffs depending on the circuit in which the agency hearing the
case is located.
D. Exposition of Inconsistencies and Negative Consequences
of the Literal Approach
In addition to the expected inconsistency resulting from the cir-
cuit split described in Part II.C, this Section will explore two
inconsistencies that result from adopting the literal approach and
discuss their implications to show its doctrinal inadequacy. First, de-
fendants in state agencies may not remove their cases, while
defendants in state courts may. Circuits that forbid removal from
agencies have the burden of explaining this apparent inconsistency.
The differences in outcomes among circuits can deny defendants,
unfairly and arbitrarily, the right to choose their forum. In many
circumstances, agencies and courts have concurrent jurisdiction.146
In those cases, the plaintiff’s choice determines whether an admin-
istrative agency hears a case, rather than a principled legislative
decision about the best suited forum. Therefore, when federal
courts permit removal from state courts, but not from state agen-
cies, the choice appears to be largely arbitrary.
Second, courts using the literal approach are inconsistent be-
cause they force defendants to wait until the agency reaches a final
disposition before permitting recourse to another court. This in-
consistency results in cases being heard before state agencies where
federal question or diversity jurisdiction is properly invoked. In
such cases, the defendant may appeal following, but not before, ad-
judication, even though they intend to appeal. This proceeding is
thus superfluous because, if the defendant loses, appeal is inevita-
ble. In addition, the costs of an unnecessary proceeding create
significant inefficiencies and delays in the adjudicatory process.147
This inconsistency emerged because the first Judiciary Act
granted federal courts appellate jurisdiction over state courts by two
avenues: through removal and following a final disposition.148 Re-
moval is itself a mode of appellate jurisdiction; that is, appellate
jurisdiction exercised before proceedings begin in the lower
146. See, e.g., Bellsouth Telecoms, Inc. v. Vartec Telecom, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280,
1284–85 (N.D. Fl. 2002); Emily M. Rector, Note, Removing from State Administrative Agencies, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2269, 2278 (2009).
147. Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation,
85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 229, 240 (1997).
148. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1499, 1535 (1990).
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court.149 In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story described removal
as appellate jurisdiction (permitted by Article III of the Constitu-
tion and granted by Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789)
exercised before state courts have undergone proceedings.150  In
general, defendants may appeal state agency cases to federal courts
if federal question or diversity jurisdiction are properly invoked.151
Thus, there is a discrepancy among different stages of appellate re-
view. In some cases, despite the fact that a party may eventually
appeal to a federal court, she may not “appeal” the case through
removal from the state agency. When federal courts (rarely) review
agency decisions, they do so as original civil actions (either under a
de novo or deferential review standard), and not under their appel-
late review authority.152 Thus, considerable inefficiencies will result
from this inconsistency; two adjudicative bodies will review entire
cases, wasting adjudicatory time and money.
This Part has established that there are disparities between the
success of plaintiffs in state agencies and federal courts. Also, the
appellate process is significantly more arduous for the typical defen-
dant, who is required to pass through the administrative appeals,
state appellate, and then federal appellate process. Few defendants
survive this process long enough to be heard by a federal court, in
part because appeal is almost always cost-prohibitive.153 If we con-
sider the faults of the appellate process, then, there is an evident
difference in outcomes between jurisdictions that permit removal
and those that do not. Thus, the various inconsistencies inherent in
the current treatment of removal from state agencies could result
in unjustified harm to some defendants and not others, namely
through their lower chances of winning and the high costs of ap-
peal. In addition, when federal courts forbid parties from
removing, cases are heard in more forums than are necessary, mak-
ing the courts hearing these cases less efficient.
149. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 349 (1816) (“If, then, the right of removal
be included in the appellate jurisdiction, it is only because it is one mode of exercising that
power, and as congress is not limited by the constitution to any particular mode, or time of
exercising it, it may authorize a removal either before or after judgment.”).
150. Id. at 349–50 (1816).
151. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative
States, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 616 (1999). In many cases, federal courts have procedures of
abstention, which curtails this possibility. Id. at 616–17. Nevertheless, some cases remain in
which appeals are properly brought before federal courts.
152. Id. at 660–61.
153. See, e.g., Berch, supra note 4, at 106–07 (discussing appellate costs in the context of
litigation for large defendants, like Exxon Valdez).
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III. A TAILORED SOLUTION
The functional approach is preferable to the literal approach to
decide whether a state agency proceeding may be removed under
28 U.S.C. § 1441.154 As a general presumption, courts should permit
removal from any adjudicatory state proceeding. To decide whether
an agency is a court for the purposes of removal, it should use the
Floeter test.155 That is, a court should treat a state agency as a court if
it is “substantially similar to those traditionally associated with the
judicial process.”156 As defined more narrowly in Ford Motor Co. v.
McCullion, the test should include, as factors, whether the agency
performs the following functions: “filing of pleadings”; “taking of
depositions”; “issuance of subpoenas”; “contempt powers”; and
“powers to act, namely: injunctive, declaratory or compensatory re-
lief.”157 This list of functions is non-exhaustive and courts have
frequently applied other factors to decide whether an agency body
is sufficiently “court-like.”158
First, this Part describes a variation on the functional approach
that will best serve the purposes of both legislative intent and public
policy. Next, it justifies the rule with arguments relevant to two al-
ternative institutional actors. It will argue that Congress should
clarify its intent via statute to resolve the lack of clarity in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441’s application to state administrative agencies. Then, if Con-
gress does not act, the courts should use the legislative history of
the statute to conform the rule to Congressional intent.
In Section A, this Part explains two classes of adjudication where
state agencies should not be treated as courts for the purposes of
removal. Section B discusses why the functional approach as modi-
fied by these exceptions conforms to public policy considerations.
Section C describes how the modified functional approach con-
forms to legislative intent. Section D considers and responds to
possible criticisms.
154. See supra, Part II.C and II.D.
155. Most courts that apply the functional approach have adopted this test. It offers a
common sense taxonomy of agency actions, where adjudications that could have been
brought in a court, and that have many or all of the same features as a court, may be removed
to federal court.
156. Floeter v. C.W. Transport, Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979).
157. Ford Motor Co. v. McCullion, No. C2-88-142, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19116, at *6–7
(S.D. Ohio April 14, 1989).
158. Ford, supra note 96, at 332–33. The question of which exact factors demonstrate that
an adjudicative body is court-like is not within the purview of this Note.
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A. Functional Plus: A Variation on the Rule
The general Floeter-McCullion factors should be limited in two cir-
cumstances to best accord with the legislative intent underlying the
first Judiciary Act and public policy considerations. First, cases
should not be removable from agencies when agency expertise is so
vital that a federal judge is not able to handle the case as well as an
agency adjudicator. Judges should consider whether the subject
matter of an agency’s adjudication requires specialized legal or
technical knowledge that gives the agency a significant advantage
over courts in justly deciding a case. For example, state agencies
that resolve water rights issues under both federal and state statutes
rely heavily on the technical expertise of the agency.159 In such
cases, the agency relies on its institutional knowledge and the ex-
pertise of engineers and scientists to reach decisions regarding the
rights of claimants to various waters.160 It would be inappropriate to
remove such cases because federal judges are ill-equipped to han-
dle those disputes. In comparison, if state agency adjudications use
methods judges are familiar with, like in disputes over collective
bargaining agreements, then they should be removable.
Second, cases should not be removable from administrative agen-
cies whose statutory authority expresses a clear Congressional
intent to prefer the plaintiff. Congress often considers the third-
party policy effects resulting from the agency forum.161 It also
designates agencies in order to ensure that claimants receive a low-
cost and timely judgment.162 In such cases, the legislative intent
should trump the general rule permitting removal. For example,
agency proceedings should not be removable in proceedings before
a state Fair Employment Practice Agency in a suit under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.163 Title VII creates a presumption in favor of
the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim by granting her
159. John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and
Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 362 (2006).
160. Id.
161. See Removal to Federal Courts from State Administrative Agencies, 69 YALE L.J. 615, 619–20
(1960).
162. See id. at 619.
163. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
AGENCIES (FEPAS) AND DUAL FILING, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm (last visited
September 27, 2015). A Fair Employment Practice Agency is a state adjudicative body empow-
ered to hear federal and state employment discrimination claims. See Notes & Comments,
Removal to Federal Courts from State Administrative Agencies, 69 YALE L.J. 615, 619–20 (1960).
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broad discretion in choice of forums.164 Further, the legislative his-
tory similarly suggests that Congress intended to favor the plaintiff’s
choice of where to bring her case.165 In Title VII cases, Congress
intended for the plaintiff to have a broad range of forum options so
that the statute would provide protection from harmful practices.166
B. The Legislative Solution: An Argument from Public Policy
The preferable solution to the problems listed above is legisla-
tion that clarifies the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1441. It should permit
removal from state agencies that have court-like proceedings under
the Floeter-McCullion criteria, but do not fall into one of the above-
mentioned exceptions. A legislative change that broadens the scope
of the removal statute is clearly justified by public policy considera-
tions, including fairness to defendants, efficiency of court
proceedings, and consistency across jurisdictions and forums. This
modification permits Congress to encompass the public policy con-
siderations in establishing the test for a court-like agency
proceeding, without reference to the original removal statute. The
preferable public policy considerations are perhaps clearer than
the legislative intent behind the statute (which courts must ascer-
tain by parsing through documents over a century old), and a
statutory amendment is more likely to be consistently applied across
jurisdictions.
First, the rule described above ensures that civil defendants are
guaranteed as much of a right to choose their forum as are plain-
tiffs. As discussed in Part I, removal is necessary to allow defendants
to choose the forum in which their case is heard.167 To ensure fair-
ness to both parties, removal avoids many of the disadvantages
caused by forcing a defendant to remain in the plaintiff’s choice of
forum.168 Considerable evidence indicates that the ability to choose
one’s forum is an advantage in litigation.169
In addition, fact-finding in state agencies may be given preclusive
weight in later appeals, binding the defendant to decisions of the
agency because she could not remove her case.170 Courts apply a
164. Piper Hoffman, How Many Plaintiffs Are Enough? Venue in Title VII Class Actions, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. Reform 843, 845 (2009).
165. See id. at 847.
166. See Mahoney, supra note 93, at 332–33.
167. See supra, Part I.C.
168. See supra, Part II.A.
169. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 602.
170. Ford, supra note 96, at 340.
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common law rule akin to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, to state administrative agencies.171 This rule gives agency
fact-finding preclusive effect and the federal reviewing body is re-
quired to give “substantial weight to final findings and orders” of
state administrative agencies.172 Thus, in some cases, not only is the
appeal likely to be cost-prohibitive, but federal courts must also give
substantial weight to the agency’s findings of fact.
The exception to the Floeter-McCullion rule, which forbids re-
moval where there is a clear Congressional intent favoring
plaintiffs, provides a tool of statutory construction for courts. The
Floeter-McCullion rule presumes that Congress intends fairness to de-
fendants in every statute that might be adjudicated in a state
administrative agency. However, where Congress has specifically
spoken on the subject with respect to a given statute, the rule gives
way in favor of Congress’s particular policy preference.  Congress
may justifiably advantage one party where one party typically has
more resources to fund a legal challenge,173 for example, or where
a particular group or class has been historically discriminated
against.174
Second, this rule will increase the efficiency of overall adjudica-
tive proceedings in the long run. There are two possible (and
opposed) efficiency consequences to the functional approach. On
the one hand, this rule may generate inefficiencies because it opens
up federal dockets to many more defendants.175 Some have argued
that the opportunity to remove cases to federal court will result in
many defendants taking advantage of that opportunity, further bur-
dening the federal docket and creating costly delays in the state
agency proceedings.176 The functional approach may, however, ulti-
mately generate efficiencies if those defendants would eventually
appeal to federal court.177 Some courts perform de novo review of
171. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986).
172. Id. at 795.
173. For example, in labor disputes, employers tend to leverage their litigation resources
to get courts to enforce non-compete clauses, where an equal division of resources may yield
a different outcome. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based
Theory to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 1002 (2012).
174. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17. See
generally Mahoney, supra note 93 (discussing the Congressional intent to remove barriers for
Title VII plaintiffs).
175. Johnson, supra note 147, at 229, 240 (discussing the significant delays in the civil
federal court system, the high costs of those delays, and the drain on public resources from
increased federal dockets).
176. See id.
177. See Matthew J. Sorenson, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court
After Atlantic Marine, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2527–28 (2014) (discussing the transactions
costs that result from being forced into a different forum).
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state agency proceedings,178 and even when they do not, courts
must at least examine the agency fact-finding for abuse of discre-
tion and substantial evidence.179 When a defendant who knows she
will eventually appeal is not permitted to remove her case to federal
court at the beginning of the proceedings, her case will functionally
be heard twice by different tribunals. This unnecessary conse-
quence can be prevented by permitting her to remove her case
from the state agency.
The exception to the Floeter-McCullion test that forbids removal
where an agency has expertise promotes efficiency. While it is gen-
erally more efficient for fewer tribunals to hear a particular case,180
where adjudication requires complicated and specialized knowl-
edge, the body with that knowledge is the logical “court” of first
impression. In such cases, if federal courts were the courts of first
impression, they would require expert testimony and additional re-
search efforts to reach a decision.181 Thus, a general interest in
efficiency would counsel in favor of including the expertise
exception.
Third, the stated rule best produces consistency across jurisdic-
tion and forum. It enforces a commitment to treating similar cases
alike. Functionally, in many cases, there is no difference between
agency and court adjudication. Consider BellSouth Telecommunica-
tions v. Vartec Telecommunications, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Fla.
2002). In that case, the court held that the defendant was not enti-
tled to removal because the state agency that heard its case did not
perform the functions of a court.182 The court permitted the plain-
tiff to either bring its case in a state court or before a state agency
because both tribunals had legitimate jurisdiction.183 Because the
plaintiff chose a state agency, the defendant could not remove the
178. See Ford, supra note 96, at 349.
179. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative
Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1165–66 (1995).
180. See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecution Use of Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Crimi-
nal Cases: Promoting Consistency, Tolerating Inconsistency, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 414 (2012)
(discussing the efficiency gains from rules that limit re-litigation of issues).
181. See Michael Penney, Note, Application of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine to Clean Air Act
Citizen Suits, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399, 420 (2002) (discussing the inefficiencies inher-
ent in courts attempting to adjudicate cases over which they need technical expertise).
182. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Vartec Telecom., Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283
(2002).
183. Id. at 1284–85 (“[Such claims] are normally filed in [state] court . . . 364.07, Fla.
Stat. (2001) . . . gives the Florida Public Service Commission jurisdiction to resolve at least
some disputes between carriers.”).
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case.184 Thus, it is arbitrary to advantage the plaintiff so significantly
in one of these forums but not the other when both the agency and
the court could hear the case.
C. The Judicial Solution: An Argument from Legislative Intent
If Congress does not resolve the circuit split with clearer text,
courts should nevertheless apply the above interpretation based on
an analysis of legislative intent. The policy considerations that Con-
gress should consider parallel the legislative intent of the statute’s
authors. Congress first passed the removal statute to protect the
rights of defendants and to allow for broadly permissive removal
from the only state adjudicators at the time, state courts.185 Al-
though courts have recently applied the literal approach to the
removal statute, a commitment to legislative intent would require
courts to apply the functional approach. This approach best con-
forms to the changed and changing adjudicatory landscape.
The legislative history of the 1789 Judiciary Act suggests that
Congress intended the removal statute’s diversity provision to ad-
dress the concern of fairness to defendants, one of the main
justifications of the functional approach. Under the 1789 Act, de-
fendants were only permitted to remove for purposes of diversity
and not on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction.186 Thus, under
the 1789 Act, plaintiffs held the exclusive right to choose their fo-
rum.187 Under a draft of the Act, removal was only permitted for
defendants in state courts, but the Judiciary Committee ultimately
expanded the right of removal to both plaintiffs and defendants.188
In addition, under a draft version of the Act, diversity jurisdiction
would have applied even if neither party were a citizen of the state
in which the claim was brought.189 The final version requires that
one party must be a citizen of the state in which the claim was
brought.190 Thus, Congress considered a much broader application
of the statute in its previous versions, but ultimately decided on a
rule that applied only to defendants.191
184. Id. at 1281 (“I conclude that the Florida Public Service Commission is an administra-
tive agency, and not a court, both generally and when addressing matters of this type, and
that removal therefore was improper.”).
185. Collins, supra note 46, at 743; Warren, supra note 11, at 92.
186. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 § 12.
187. See Collins, supra note 46, at 743.
188. Warren, supra note 11, at 92.
189. Id. at 90–91.
190. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 § 12.
191. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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The legislative intent underlying the federal question removal
statute similarly supports the functional approach. As described in
Part I.C, the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1875 suggests
that Congress intended to broaden federal jurisdiction for many
reasons, including fear that state courts were hostile to applying
federal law, apprehension that the law would not be applied uni-
formly, and doubts regarding the competency of the state courts.192
With these purposes in mind, the 1875 Act should be understood as
conferring a broad right of removal from state courts.193 The ex-
panding jurisdiction of administrative agencies naturally shifts the
balance of cases away from state courts.194 However, this frustrates
the original intent of Congress in permitting removal, at least in
part out of concern for defendants.195
Legislative intent similarly justifies the exceptions to the general
rule. First, the exception for a clear Congressional preference for
plaintiffs is justified by legislative intent because the removal statute
should be read as conferring only a presumed right of removal.
While the removal statute may establish a general Congressional
preference for fairness to defendants and broad permission to re-
move from state adjudicators, it should not trump later evidence
that Congress intended to favor plaintiffs in particular types of dis-
putes. Second, the agency expertise exception avoids Congress’s
main worry that state courts lacked expertise.196 In these areas, adju-
dicator expertise in applying federal law motivates a decision to
forbid removal because the state agency has the technical knowl-
edge to accurately apply the law.
D. Response to Criticism
Opponents of the functional approach assert that the removal
process will frustrate some of the purposes of state administrative
agencies, including the development of expertise, easing the delay
and costs inherent in judicial proceedings, and creating a forum for
interests disfavored by courts.197 Also, there is an alleged expressive
concern that results from this rule: state agencies become underval-
ued and removal may function as an “implicit insult” to those
192. See also Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 104–09;  Wiecek, supra note 11, at 341.
193. See supra Part I.C (explaining the trend toward broadening defendants’ right to
removal).
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. See Seinfeld, supra note 12, at 104–09.
196. Id. at 108–09.
197. See, e.g., Haggard, supra note 109, at 1868.
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agencies.198 The modified rule recommended by this Note is re-
sponsive to all of these concerns.
First, the expertise exception directly responds to the first cri-
tique leveled by opponents. Where there is highly technical or
complicated knowledge required to resolve a dispute, the court of
first impression should always be the administrative agency. How-
ever, many state agencies do not have specialized technical
knowledge, but rather, exist for other reasons (including efficiency,
the desire for quick resolution of disputes, and the ability to con-
duct a more detailed factual investigation).199 In such cases, the
expertise argument for a literal approach is unwarranted.
Second, some critics challenge the efficiency consequences of in-
corporating state agency adjudications into the federal court
system.200 They argue that the ability to remove cases will create an
incentive for parties to frustrate and delay the federal judicial pro-
cess.201 The ability to remove to federal court (and the ancillary
consideration of whether a state agency adjudication is court-like)
may delay the administrative process and further burden federal
dockets.202 The corresponding increases in efficiency from the pro-
posed rule likely outweigh the increased delay and other
anticipated inefficiencies (as argued in Part II.C). By reducing the
number of tribunals in which a case must be heard, removed cases
will lighten the burden on both administrative agencies and federal
courts. As of yet, no reliable empirical data exists comparing the
efficiency outcomes between jurisdictions that do and do not apply
the functional approach. Nevertheless, the fairness and competency
concerns tend to tip the scale in favor of the proposed rule.
Third, where the purpose of a state agency is to offer a forum to
plaintiffs whom courts often disadvantage, the Congressional pref-
erence exception to the functional approach should apply. For
example, plaintiffs with limited resources often cannot afford to en-
gage in costly and time-consuming litigation. By exempting agency
adjudication where Congress has expressed a preference for plain-
tiffs, this criticism can be entirely avoided. If the purpose of the
adjudicative body is to give plaintiffs a unique forum, it would be
self-defeating to permit defendants to remove from that forum at
will.
198. Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 512.
199. Haggard, supra note 109, at 1868–69.
200. See Johnson, supra note 147, at 229, 240; see also Haggard, supra note 109, at 1868.
201. Haggard, supra note 109, at 1867–68.
202. Id. at 1868; Johnson, supra note 147, at 229, 239.
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Finally, the recommended rule may add to the “implicit insult” to
state courts by applying it to state agencies.203 This expressive argu-
ment suggests that the rule undervalues the role of state
administrative agencies.204 First, this contention probably mis-
characterizes the expressive effect. By permitting a defendant to
remove, the functional approach merely asserts a defendant’s right
to have her case heard where she believes she will most likely win.
Defendants also know that agencies have expertise and efficiencies
that federal courts do not have. The rule does not create a prefer-
ence for federal courts, but merely gives defendants the same
choice of forum that plaintiffs enjoy. Second, even if the recom-
mended rule does undervalue state agencies, the expressive
concerns should not trump the rights of actual parties.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that a modified functional approach is
the most logical and natural interpretation of the removal statute.
Often, state agencies perform the same functions as state courts,
but the parties before them are treated differently. A literal ap-
proach misconstrues Congressional intent of the removal statute: it
does not matter whether a tribunal is called a court; it matters
whether a tribunal acts as a court. Because of some Circuits’ strict
textualism, courts have failed to adapt the statute appropriately to
changing times. In the process, defendants, agencies, and courts
are all harmed. If agencies are more qualified, then cases should
not be removable. Also, where Congress conveys a clear preference
for plaintiffs, cases should not be removable. In all other court-like
agency tribunals, the just and reasonable solution is the functional
approach.
203. Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 512.
204. Haggard, supra note 109, at 1868.
